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Abstract
Estimating saving and fertility simultaneously by the VAR method, we find that
social security cover has a positive effect on household saving, and a negative
effect on fertility. In Germany, as in other countries where the hypothesis was
tested, social security is thus good for growth. A possible explanation for this
unconventional finding is that compulsory saving in the form of pension
contributions tends to displace intra-family transfers, rather than asset
formation. However, the negative effect of social security on fertility tends to
erode the system’s own contributory base, because it reduces the number of
future contributors. That is one of the reasons why, in Germany as elsewhere,
pay-as-you-go pension systems tend to be financially unstable. To some extent,
this is counteracted by child-related benefits, which tend to encourage fertility,
but the effect appears to be weak.
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In a series of papers, Cigno and Rosati (1992, 1996, 1997) report that, contrary to conventional wisdom, social security
coverage tends to stimulate aggregate household saving, and to depress fertility. This appears to dispell the widely held
view that compulsory saving through a public pension system is bad for growth. On the other hand, since the fertility rate is
an inverse predictor (for any given trend in life expectancy) of the age-dependency ratio thirty years hence, the finding of a
negative effect of social security on fertility provides an explanation for the periodical financial crises, associated in large
measure with an ever rising number of beneficiaries for each contributor, undergone by pay-as-you-go pension systems
throughout the world. However, the only estimates available for Germany, presented in the 1996 article, show an
insignificant effect of social security coverage on household saving.  As pointed out to us by Martin Werding, this could
reflect the fact that, in the case of Germany, C-R used too broad a definition of social security expenditure, including more
than just old-age pensions. The present paper improves on C-R in a number of ways. It uses the correct social security data,
introduces various kinds of child-related benefits as additional variables, and extends the sample period. It also uses a more
sophisticated econometric methodology, that allows one to recover a number of interrelations lost in the single-equation
estimatios carried out by C-R. We shall see that these innovations produce important changes in the results. Social security
coverage turns out to have a positive effect on household saving in Germany, as it does in Italy, Japan, UK and USA. In
Germany as elsewhere, child benefits stimulate fertility, but their effect is relatively weak. Possible ways of using this
information for social security reform are discussed in the last two sections.
2. Theoretical background
Life-cycle theory predicts that compulsory participation in a pension system reduces voluntary household saving. If the
system is actuarially fair (in the sense that the expected value of the benefits is equal to the expected value of the
contributions), and abstracting from distortions to marginal incentives, forced saving in the form of pension contributions
substitutes for voluntary saving one-for-one. If the system is more than actuarially fair, there is a further effect. For a person
of working age, the promise of a pension rise, without a corresponding increase in working-life contributions, constitutes an
increase in wealth, that (assuming normality) will induce him or her to consume more throughout the life cycle. Voluntary
saving will thus fall more, than if the pension rise were matched by a rise in contributions. In other words, there will be a
fall in voluntary saving attributable to the pension rise per se, and a further drop attributable to the fact that the rise is a gift.
Re-descovering Ricardian equivalence, Barro (1974) maintains that, since the “gift” to the currently active
generation will have to be paid for by subsequent ones, parental love will move the beneficiaries to hand the money back to
their children. Assuming that they do so in the form of bequests,
3 this will have a positive effect on saving, as current
workers accumulate assets to bequeath. While an increase in social security benefits matched by a corresponding increase in
contributions affects saving negatively as in life-cycle theory, an intergenerational transfer (such as the one implied by a
pension rise unaccompanied by a rise in contributions) will then affect saving positively. Incorporating Becker’s ideas on
endogenous fertility, Becker and Barro (1988) adjust the aim of Barro (1974) to account for the fact that the increase in
bequests induced by an intergenerational transfer would raise the marginal cost of a child, thereby triggering a substitution
away from number of children. While an increase in social security cover per se (i.e.,paid for by the beneficiaries) reduces
saving, and has no effect on fertility, as in life-cycle theory and in Barro (1974), an intergenerational transfer will then
induce a reduction in fertility, and a rise in the amount saved for each child. Depending on the relative elasticities of per-
child saving and number of children to the transfer, this could then have either a positive or a negative effect on per-adult
saving  (and thus on the saving rate).
Whichever assumption is made about the way a person would respond to a forced transfer from the next
generation, the central idea underlying all these theories is that individuals make provision for old age exclusively through
the capital market. Cigno (1993) proposes an alternative framework, where working-age individuals can either accumulate
assets by saving, or accumulate credits towards their own children by giving them material and personal support in the early
stages of life.
4 In developed economies, the return to the latter will be predominantly in terms in personal attention (rather
than material support) when the children have reached working age, and the parents are old. As fertility is then seen as a
vehicle for life-cycle re-allocations, compulsory saving in the form of pension contributions reduces the incentive to have
children. It also reduces voluntary saving for those who would have used the capital market anyway, but increases it for
                                                                
3 Or, at any rate, “late” in life.
4 Rosati (1996) eliminates the dicothomy between saving and fertility by introducing uncertainty. The comparative-statics properties of the model remain
substantially unchanged, but the agent will not necessarily jump from one corner solution to the other.3
those who would have otherwise invested in children only.
5 Thus, social security per se displaces asset accumulation for
some, fertility and voluntary transfers for others. While the effect on aggregate fertility is clearly negative, the effect on
aggregate household saving may thus be positive or negative (rather than necessarily zero as in Becker-Barro). A forced
intergenerational transfer in favour of current workers reduces current saving by those who save (as in life-cycle theory), but
it raises the number of those who invest in children instead of saving.
6 The effect on aggregate fertility is thus positive, but
the effect on aggregate household saving is ambiguous.
The different household decision models have different implications also with regard to the effects of child-related
benefits.
7 An increase in the child benefit rate financed by taxes on current workers re-distributes from individuals in the
middle to individuals at the earlier stages of the life cycle. If fertility is exogenous, as in life-cycle theory or Barro (1974),
the effect on aggregate household saving is obviously negative, because the young save proportionately less than the
middle-aged. If fertility is endogenous, however, child benefits reduce the marginal cost of children. In a model à la Becker
and Barro (1988), there would then be a positive effect on fertility, an ambiguous one on saving. The same is true of Cigno
(1993), but for different reasons. On the one hand, the number of those who invest exclusively in the capital market falls
relative to those investing in children. On the other, risk-spreading considerations (Rosati, 1996) will induce the latter to
accumulate more assets, as well as to have more children.
Wage rates raise full income, which has a positive effect on saving and, if fertility is endogenous, on the number of
children. However, wage rates (particularly the mother’s) raise also the opportunity-cost of having a child. In endogenous-
fertility models, there is thus a substitution-effect away from number of children, which is empirically found to dominate
the positive income-effect in the case of female wage rates, to be dominated by it in the case of male wage rates. In a model
à la Barro-Becker, where the number of children is a substitute for the lifetime utility (“quality”) of each child, the effect of
male wage rates is then positive for both saving and fertility, while that of female wage rates is ambiguous for saving,
negative for fertility. In Cigno (1993), where children are an alternative to conventional assets, the effect of male wage rates
is again positive for both saving and fertility, but the effect of female wage rates is negative for both.
The effect of the interest rate on saving is notoriously ambiguous in life-cycle theory, and so it remains in more
complicated models. The same is true of its effects on fertility, in models where the latter is endogenous.
3. The evidence so far
Taking fertility as exogenous, and overlooking the possible effects of intergenerational re-distributions caused by deficit-
financing, Feldstein (1974, 1980) and many others after him (e.g., for Germany, Kim, 1992) have found a negative effect of
social security on household saving.
8 Taking fertility and household saving as simultaneously determined, and controlling
for the social security deficit, however, Cigno and Rosati (1996) find that, in Italy, UK, USA and West Germany, social
security coverage has a negative effect on fertility,
9 rather than on saving. Aggregate household saving is found to be
positively affected by social security cover everywhere
10 except in West Germany, where the effect is not significant. The
social security deficit has no significant effect on fertility, but it has a significantly negative effect on saving in all the
countries considered, including West Germany. In the UK, the only country for which such data were available, C-R find
that child benefits have a positive effect on fertility, but no significant effect on saving. Fertility is also found to be affected
positively by male wage rates, negatively by female ones.
11 Interest rate effects turn out to be either small or insignificant.
All in all, these findings appear to reject not only the exogenous-fertility hypothesis underlying both life-cycle theory and
Barro (1974), but also the Becker-Barro approach to the simultaneous determination of saving and fertility, in favour of the
line of explanation provided by Cigno (1993) and Rosati (1996). They also point to a possible “anomaly”: in West
Germany, aggregate household saving does not appear to be affected by social security cover like everywhere else. While
consistent with the same theoretical model, this suggests that something in that country may be different.
C-R’s are single-equation estimates, based on aggregate time series. Using co-integration methods, C-R estimated
a saving and a fertility equation separately for each country, using social security coverage, the social security deficit, the
child benefit rate (not in the case of Germany), the rate of interest, income, and the average male and female wage rates, as
                                                                
5 In the model, making transfers to parents is a condition for receiving transfers from children, but the size of the former (an implicit loan re-payment) is
unrelated to the size of the transfers made to children (an implicit loan). Suppose that a person, who would have otherwise relied on this system of intra-
family transfers, is obliged to contribute to a public pension scheme. This will make her want to have fewer children, and to lend them less. But, if she
lends them anything at all,  she must also  honour her fixed debt to her own parents, or her children will not honour theirs. If that is not be worth her while,
she will drop out of the intra-family transfer system altogether, and top up her expected pension by saving through the capital market.
6 The reason is that the marginal utility of current income increases with the number of childrren (Cigno, 1993). By introducing uncertainty, Rosati (1996)
eliminates the dicothomy between saving and having children.
7 Although neither Becker nor Barro, even less Modigliani and the other life-cycle theorists, have ever concerned themselves with the issue.
8 But see the contrary findings of Graham (1987).
9 Similar results apply to developing countries. For a survey, see Cigno (1992).
10 Cigno and Rosati (1997) report a positive effect of pension coverage, and a negative effect of the deficit, also for Japan.
11 Saving is positively affected by income, rather than by the wage rates.4
regressors. This estimated equations are interpreted as a reduced form of the aggregate
12 household model that generated the
data. Since the theoretical prediction of Cigno (1993) regarding the effect of social security on aggregate household saving
is ambiguous, the finding of an insignificant effect could simply mean that, in Germany unlike elsewhere, the positive effect
on the amount saved by some of the households (those who invest in children), and the negative effect on the amount saved
by others (those who invest exclusively in conventional assets), cancel out. But it could also mean that the C-R estimates are
inaccurate. Given the importance of saving and fertility for economic growth, and for the financial balance of pay-as-you-go
social security systems, we re-estimated the two equations simultaneously, using longer time-series and a more
sophisticated method of estimation, that does not assume, beforehand, which are the independent and which the dependent
variables. The latter is relevant, because saving and fertility affect growth, and growth in turn affects not only wage and
interest rates, but also social expenditures such as old-age pensions and child benefits. There could thus be reverse causation
from saving and fertility to the variables that C-R assume to be exogenous, as well as cross-links, missed out by single-
equation estimation. We also used more accurate pension data, and included various measures of child-related  benefits
(omitted in the C-R estimates for Germany).
4. Variables and data
As in Cigno and Rosati (1996), household saving is defined as the difference between household disposable income and
expenditure. Fertility is the total number of births over a woman’s lifetime. Social security coverage is alternatively defined
as the ratio of  total pension benefits to number of persons aged 65 or over (the “intensive” measure), or as the ratio of
number of old-age pensions to number of persons aged 65 or over (the “extensive” measure). The social security deficit is
the difference between social  security benefits and contributions. In their 1996 paper, C-R used, for Germany, a definition
of benefits that includes not only pensions, but  also other forms of public transfer. In the present paper, by contrast, we only
include pensions. We also introduce a new variable, not used for Germany in the C-R study, that provides a measure of
child-related benefits. This is defined as the sum, per child, of an actual cash transfer (Kindergeld), an additional cash
payment reserved for parents of very young children (Erziehungsgeld) and a tax allowance (Kinderfreibetrag). Another
child-related variable is represent by the notional pension contribution credited to parents who withdraw from the labour
market in order to look after a new-born child.
13 The other variables are, as in C-R, household disposable income, the
average male and the average female wage rate, and the long-term rate of interest. All monetary variables are at 1990 prices.
All variables, except the interest rate, are in logs. The sample period is 1960–95, as against 1965-90 in C-R.
FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE
The fertility rate measures completed fertility per woman (the total number of children born, on average, to a
woman between the ages of 15 and 49).  As shown in Fig. 1, West German fertility rises slowly from 1960 to 1966. After
that date, it falls rapidly, from a peak of just over two and a half children per woman, to just under one and a half towards
the end of the 70s. From then onwards, the decline tends to slow down, eventually turning into a slight recovery from the
second half of the 80s. The same figure shows also the child benefit rate, calculated, as already explained, as the sum of the
tranfers and tax allowances to which the average household is entitled for each child. This rate rises fast from 1982
onwards. In particular, there is a big jump in 1986.
14 That is also the year in which a parent withdrawing from the market to
look after a child starts to be credited with the notional pension contribution mentioned earlier. However, since the per-child
value of these credits, not shown, is collinear with the child benefit rate, the two variables cannot be used at the same time
(we choose the child benefit rate, that covers the whole sample period). To test for the possibility of a structural break in the
series, we tried a dummy for that year, which turned out to be significant (more about this later).
The saving rate is defined as the ratio of household saving to household disposable income. Fig. 2 shows this rate
growing rapidly from the beginning of the 60s to the mid-70s, when it passes the 15 % mark. After the oil shocks of that
period, we observe fluctuations around a downward trend, finally bringing household saving below 12 % of household
disposable income.
FIGURES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE
                                                                
12 In Cigno (1993), the theory endogenously determines the proportion of households relying exclusively on the capital market, and that of of households
investing also in children.
13 The credit is equal to a fraction (originally less than one, subsequently raised to 100%) of average earnings. This arragement, first introduced in 1986,
was eventually made unconditional on the parent actually giving up work.
14 That is the year in which the tax allowance (Kinderfreibetrag), withdrawn by the social-democrats in 1975, and re-introduced by the christian-democrats
in 1982, shows a major increase.5
Fig. 3 shows household income, and the ratio of female to male wage rates, fluctuating around rising trends. In
relative terms, the average female wage rate goes up from less than 60% of the male average, at the start of the sample
period, to about 71% at the end of it (but notice the dip at the end of the 60s). Fig. 4 shows the real interest rate fluctuating
(with the nominal rate apparently lagging behind inflation) without any discernible trend.
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
Fig. 5 shows the extensive measure of social security coverage growing throughout the sample period, and getting
above 100% by the end of it. Since this index represents the number of old-age pensions per person of pensionable age, a
more than full coverage implies early retirement. The intensive measure (old-age benefits per person of pensionable age)
grows faster than the extensive measure, indicating a deepening of social security coverage. Although the signs of the
various effects are the same whether we use the extensive or the intensive measure of coverage, the latter performs
invariably better.  The estimates discussed below are based on the intensive measure. The same diagram shows also the
behaviour of the intensive measure of social security coverage under the broader definition (social security benefits per
person of pensionable age)  used by C-R. The latter grows faster than the one used in our analysis. In particular, it continues
to grow in the 1975-81 period, when the correct measure is fairly flat.
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE
Finally, Fig. 6 shows the behaviour of the social security deficit, expressed as a percentage of household disposable
income. Using the narrower definition of pension benefits, this deficit fluctuates around the 1% mark, becoming temporarily
negative (i.e., turning into a surplus) only between 1970 and 1975. This contrasts with the broader definition, used by C-R,
which is always negative, and shows a strong negative trend (increasing surplus).
4. Econometric methodology
As already pointed out, general equilibrium considerations make it inadvisable to assume that all variables other than
fertility and saving are exogenous. Although there are strong theoretical reasons for believing that fertility and saving are
affected by the economic variables included in the analysis, the existence of some reverse causation cannot be excluded a
priori. For example, the policy maker could have responded to the sustained decline in fertility by raising the child-benefit
rate. Similarly, it could have responded to the sustained fall in voluntary saving by jacking up compulsory saving (social
security contributions). Moreover, there could be important cross-effects between fertility and saving, that would escape
single-equation estimation. Put another way, estimating single equations for saving and fertility gets rid of the endogenous
correlation between these two variables, and wastes other valuable information on the behaviour of the model. This
problems can be overcome by estimating the system as a VAR model. That way, all the variables are considered as
potentially endogenous, and it is possible to extract all the information present in the data, without restricting oneself in
advance to a particular set of causal relations.
To estimate a VAR model in levels, all the regressors must be stationary. A look at the data tells us that this not the
case. To check for the presence of unit roots, we use the D-F and A-D-F tests (Dickey and Fuller, 1979). The results,
reported in Table A1 of the Appendix, indicate that it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of integration of order one,
at a high level of significance, in any of the time series. However, the presence of unit roots does not rule out the possibility
that we are dealing with I(2) variables. The issue has received considerable attention in the recent econometric literature,
because it can lead to several problems in the specification and estimation of a model.
15 To check for the possible presence
of I(2) processes it is necessary to perform unit root tests also on the first differences of the variables included in the model.
The results of these tests, also shown in Table 1 of the Appendix, indicate stationarity in first differences. In the light of this,
it is possible to conclude that all the variables in the model are I(1).
To avoid the problem of spurious regression induced by the presence of non-stationary variables (Granger and
Newbold, 1974), it is standard practice to express the model in difference terms only. The drawback of this practice is that it
wastes information about long-term relationship (important to economic analysis, crucial for its policy implications). On the
other hand, if the variables are co-integrated, the problem of estimation is reduced to the I(0) space, and it is then possible,
in a large sample, to use standard estimation techniques, in particular the OLS estimator, that has been proven to be
superconsistent (Stock, 1987).
                                                                
15 In particular, price and wage levels have been identified as possible I(2) variables.  For a comprehensive survey of the I(2) issue, see Haldrup (1998).6
Under the assumption of co-integration, it is always possible to apply the Granger representation theorem
(Granger, 1987) to the autoregressive representation, and to express a VAR model as an Error Correction Model (ECM).
This is an alternative parameterization, that allows the short-term dynamics of the variables in the system to be influenced
by deviations fron elong-term quilibrium. By this route, it is possible to estimate the elasticities that pertain to the long-term
equilibrium of the model, together with the coefficients that describe the adjustment to displacements from the equilibrium










t t i t t X X X e ,  [ ] W , 0 ~ n t IN e  ,                            (1)
where Xt  is the (n x 1) vector of variables of interest to us, G an (n x n) matrix of short-run elasticities, and P P an (n x n)
matrix of  long-run elasticities. If the number of unit roots in the system is lower than the number of co-integrating vectors,
which we call r, the matrix P P  has not full rank, and can be written as a ab b’. The (n x r) matrix b b characterizes the stationary
long-run equilibrium.
16 The (n x r) matrix  a a characterizes the adjustment process. After having imposing a number of
restrictions in order to identify the co-integrating vectors, these two matrices can be separately estimated by maximum
likelihood  tecniques,.
5. Estimates
As a first step, we estimate an unrestricted error-correction model with a constant term and eight variables: the fertility rate
(Fert), the saving rate (Sav), social security coverage (SSC), the child benefit rate (CB), the social security deficit (SSD),
male and female wage rates (Wm and Wf), and the interest rate (Int). Plotting the residuals, and examining the results of the
recursive estimations of the model, makes it clear that there is a structural break in the child benefit series in 1986. As
already mentioned, we include a dummy to account for this break. Confirming the presence of a break, the dummy turns out
to be significant in the fertility equation, and highly significant in the saving equation.
Given the structure of the data, it is necessary to include two lags in order to get rid of autocorrelation problems in
the residuals. In Table A2 of the Appendix, we report on the mis-specification tests performed for each equation. These
include a version of the Portemanteau test for first-order autocorrelation (sometimes called Ljung-Box statistic), the LM test
for autocorrelation of order higher than one, and the Engle test to detect the existence of an ARCH structure of the residuals,
(Engle, 1982). We i nclude also the c
2 test for normality of the residuals.
17 To detect possible mis-specifications in the
system as a whole, we also carried out multivariate versions of the Portmanteau and c
2 normality tests. As Table A2 shows,
except for a slight problem of normality in the real interest rate, the model is correctly specified, and there are no problems
with the distribution of the residuals for the model as a whole.
 In order to determine the rank of the cointegrating matrix P P, we perform the likelihood ratio tests proposed by
Johansen (1988). The results are shown in Table A3 of the Appendix. The first of these tests refers to the maximum
eigenvalue, the second is the trace test, both with small-sample correction. Unfortunately, however, these tests are not very
powerful, especially in a small sample, and the results do not provide a definite specification of the cointegrating space. In
particular, on the basis of the standard tests, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of a number of cointegrating
relations that, depending on significance level, goes from 3 to 4 according to the maximum-eigenvalue test, and from 5 to 6
according to the trace test. On the other hand, after the small-sample correction, the results say that there are no co-
integrating vectors in the model. Given that the sample is not very large, it is thus clear that both kinds of test can lead to a
wrong specification of the co-integrating space. Further investigation is thus required.
To determine the exact cointegrating rank, we go deeper into the analysis of the P P matrix by examining the
eigenvalues of the companion matrix. These are reported in Table 1. In the unrestricted matrix, there are five roots very
close to one, that can be taken to be unity, and two complex roots with a modulus close to .88. This tells us that the
dimension of the cointegrating space is between 2 and 3. If we consider the hypothesis that r =3 (i.e., we restrict only five of
the roots, the non-complex ones, to be equal to unity), one of the two complex roots is pushed up to .93, while the other
becomes .83. If we consider the hypothesis that  r =2 (i.e., we set six of the roots equal to unity), the last root is only equal to
.81. This indicates the presence of six unit roots, and two co-integrating vectors, in the eight-variable model.
It is now possible to specify the model as a vector ECM, with a constant term, two lags for each variable, and a
dummy to account for the 1986 break in the child benefits series. Given that the dummy is not restricted in the cointegrating
space, and that the model is in first differences, the former becomes a step-dummy after cumulation: exactly what we need
to control for a break in the child benefits series.
                                                                
16 Its columns form the basis of the row space of P P.
17 See Doornik and Hansen, 1994 for a description.7
      Tab 1: Eigenvalues of the companion matrix
        Eigenvalue         unrestricted      restricted     restricted
                                                                   r=3                r=2
                 l1                      .924                    1                    1
                 l2                      .924                    1                    1
                 l3                      .946                    1                    1
                 l4                      .952                    1                    1
                 l5                      .952                    1                    1
                 l6                      .878                   .92                  1
                 l7                      .878                   .83                 .81
Our second step is to estimate the eight-variables ECM with two cointegrating relations, using the FIML technique
proposed by Johansen. The system of equations (1) to be estimated then becomes
t t t t t X X X X e b a + D G + D G + ¢ = D - - - 2 2 1 1 1 ,  [ ] W , 0 ~ n t IN e ,                                 (2)
where Xt is an eight-variable vector, and the a a and b b’ matrices have both rank two.
Given that the theory can only make predictions about long-term relationships, we focus on the estimation of the
co-integrating vectors that represent these long-term equilibrium. We identify the two vectors by setting the long-term
effects of fertility on saving, and of saving on fertility, equal to zero. We thus estimate an over-identified model. The
restrictions we are imposing can be tested.  The test is distributed as a c
2, with  the number of degrees of freedom equal to
the number of over-identifying restrictions. The null hypothesis of a wrong over-identifying restriction is rejected at a high
significance level. Our estimates of the two co-integrating relations are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Long-term  relations (standard errors in brackets)
       Fert = .19 CB  - .25 SSC + .07 SSD + .04 Int - 4.93 Wf + 5,13 Wm
                      (.008)          (.09)            (.006)            (.005)        (.38)              (.38)
       Sav = .25 SSC + .06 Int - 7.42 Wf + 9.03 Wm
                      (.13)            (.006)         (.55)             (.56)
The elements of the first co-integrating vector can be interpreted as long-term fertility elasticities. Fertility is found
to be affected negatively by social security coverage, and positively by the social security deficit (the elasticity is small, but
significantly different from zero). Child benefits and the interest rate also have a positive effect. The effects of female and
male wage rates are, respectively, negative and positive. These findings differ from those of Cigno and Rosati (1996) only
in that the latter do not not find a significant effect of the social security deficit on fertility. C-R do not include child benefits
in their estimates for Germany, but the effect of this variable is found to be positive in the only country, the UK, for which it
is considered. There could thus be two reasons why the social security deficit is insignificant in C-R’s estimates for
Germany. One, already mentioned, is that the measure of social security deficit used by C-R is incorrect. The other is that
C-R do not control for the child benefit rate. Since child benefits are a form of intergenerational tranfer (like the social
security deficit, but in the opposite direction), ignoring the former could have biased downwards C-R’s estimate of the
effect of the latter.
The elements of the second co-integrating vector can be interpreted as long-term saving elasticities. Table 6 tells us
that saving is affected positively by social security coverage, and by the rate of interest. The effects of male and female
wage rates are, respectively, positive and  negative. Those of the social security deficit, and of the child benefit rate are
insignificant, and set equal to zero.  These estimates differ from those of Cigno and Rosati (1996), who find the effect of
social security coverage to be insignificant in the case of Germany (although significantly positive in every other country
considered), and the effect of the social security deficit to be significantly negative. Taken together, these findings reject the
hypothesis, underlying life-cycle theory and Barro (1974), that fertility is exogenous, and the hypothesis, underlying Barro
(1974) and Barro-Becker (1988), that parents regard their children as a form of consumption. They are consistent, however,
with Cigno (1993), where children are treated as a form of investment. Our findings show also that, in Germany as8
elsewhere, social security coverage has a significantly positive effect on household saving. It would thus seem that, when
pension benefits are correctly measured, and all relevant variables (including the child benefit rate) are considered, German
saving and fertility behaviour is no different, qualitatively, from that of other industrialized countries. Finding that the social
security deficit has an insignificant effect on saving does not substitute one anomaly for another, because the German deficit
is very small and practically constant in relative terms (Fig. 6).
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Notice that the long-term elasticity of fertility to the child benefit rate is very small, less than .2 per cent (this can
be seen by just looking at Fig. 1). That is a very weak effect, especially if we think that it is likely to pick up not only the
effect of child benefits as generally understood (Kindergeld,  Erziehungsgeld, and Kinderfreibetrag), but also the effect of
the notional pension contributions credited to parents of young children (this variable, it will be recalled, was excluded from
the estimates beacuse of collinearity with child benefits). In view of very high estimates of the cost of raising a child,
particularly of the opportunity-cost of the mother’s time (Joshi, 1998), this is not a very surprising result. Child benefits
would have to be very large indeed to cover a significant fraction of the cost of parenthood.
Comparing the size of male and female wage effects, we can see that the former is slightly larger than the latter in
both equations. An equiproportional wage rise would thus raise both saving and fertility. This is confirmed by the fact that,
if we replace the wage rates with household income, the latter has a positive effect on both saving and fertility. Using
income instead of wages, however, makes the estimates considerably worse, and using income and wages at the same time
makes them lose significance (as one would expect, since household income is determined by the wage rates). Using
household income, and the ratio between female and male rates gives us a positive long-run effect of the former, and a
negative one of the latter, on both fertility and saving. The results, not shown, are consistent with those obtained using the
two wage rates separately, and omitting household income, but not as good econometrically.
Tab. 3:  Short-term adjustment coefficients
               (standard errors in brackets)
Variable                  a a 1                   a a 2
  Fert                           -1.15                .47
                                     (.09)              (.09)
  Sav                              .00                -.4
                                                           (.2)
 SSC                             .00                 .00
 CB                               .00                 .00
 SSD                             .00                4.00
                                                            (.9)
  Int                               .00                 .00
  Wf                              .00                 .10
                                                           (.06)
  Wm                            .00                 .12
                                                           (.07)
The elements of the a a matrix can be interpreted as the short-run responses of the model to a deviation from the
equilibrium path. Our estimates, reported in Table 3, show that none of the variables in the model, apart from fertility itself,
reacts to a short-run divergence of the fertility rate from its long-run path. By contrast, not only saving itself, but also
fertility, the social security deficit, and the wage rates, respond to short-run deviations of the household saving rate from its
long-run path. It is interesting that a temporay slackening of household saving elicits an increase in the social security
deficit, rather than a reduction in coverage.
19 This does not necessarily mean, however, that the policy maker responds by
reducing contribution rates. It could simply mean that, as income growth slows down as a consequence of the lower
propensity to save, contributions (rather than the contribution rate) decline. The finding that the real interest rate does not
respond to short-run variations in the saving behaviour of domestic households is, of course, hardly surprising. The
responsiveness of fertility, and of the wage rates (but these have low significance), to short-run deviations from equilibrium
                                                                
18 The effect of the social security deficit on fertility is statistically significant, but very small.
19 Although the elasticity is large, absolute changes are small, because small is the deficit itself.9
saving confirms the view that asset accumulation, fertility, and labour force participation by marriage partners are part and
parcel of the same decision process.
6. Simulations
To highlight the policy implications of our findings, we used our estimated lon-run relationships to project saving and
fertility behaviour beyond the sample period, under alternative scenarios. In each scenario, we have left the wage rates to
grow at the average growth rate of the sample period, the interest rate constant at tits 1995 level, and the social security
deficit constant at the sample mean. All that changes from one scenario to another is social security coverage and child
benefits. We consider the following scenarios:
S1   SSC grows at the average rate of the sample period, CB constant at the 1995 level
S2   SSC and CB grow at the avarage rate of the sample period (2 % a year the former, 1,2 % the latter)
S3   SSC constant at the 1995 level, CB grows at the average rate of the sample period
S4   SSC and CB constant at the 1995 level
S5   SSC decreases by 2,7 % a year, CB constant at the 1995 level
FIGURE S 7 AND 8 ABOUT HERE
Figures 7 and 8 show the actual fertility and saving rates for the 1980-95 period, and their simulated values (under
alternative scenarios) for the subsequent fifteen years to 2010. Being based on long-term relationships, these simulations
must not be interpreted as predictions. All they show is possible trends, conditional on alternative combinations of
assumptions. Their only purpose is to draw attention to the cumulative long-term effects of alternative policies.
We can see, from Figure 7, that a moderate contraction in social security payments (scenario S5) would raise
completed fertility by about one child per woman in fifteen years. That is roughly what was lost between 1960 and 1995,
causing the crisis in German social security. Notice that what we are hypothesizing is an annual  2.7% reduction in pension
payments per person aged 65 or over (our measure of social security coverage), not in the average pension. Therefore, part
of the reduction could be achieved by curbing early retirement. It should also be kept in mind, however, that we are holding
relative wage rates constant. Further catching-up of female on male wage rates would partially offset the effects of social
security retrenchment. Just raising child benefits (S3) would not be sufficient to prevent further fertility decline. Holding
everything constant (S4), or continuing with past policies (S1, S2) would accelerate fertility decline.
Figure 8 tells us that a modest reduction in social security coverage (scenario S5) would stabilize the household
saving rate at between 11 and 12 percent of household disposable income. Holding coverage constant (S3, S4), or allowing
it to grow at its average gowth rate in the sample period (S1, S2), would induce a recovery of the saving rate towards the
hights of the early ‘80s and ‘90s. Since child benefits have been found to have no significant effect on saving, it does not
seem to matter what happens to them. But this may not be true if we go outside the sample range. Here too, it should be kept
in mind that further catching-up of female on male wage rates would have a negative effect on saving.
7. Conclusion
We have found that, in Germany as in every other country where the hypothesis was tested, old-age security per se (i.e.,
apart from any intergenerational transfer caused by deficit-financing) has a positive effect on aggregate household saving,
and a negative effect on fertility. There is thus no German anomaly. The reason why Cigno and Rosati (1996) found the
effect to be statistically insignificant for Germany is essentially that their definition of pensions was too broad, and that not
all the relevant effects were considered. Using the correct definition of pension benefits, introducing child benefits as an
additional variable in the model, and estimating the saving and fertility equations simultaneously by the VAR method,
which captures possible cross-effects and reverse causations, we find that social security cover has a positive effect on
household saving. We also  find that child benefits encourage fertility, but that their effect is weak.
In Germany too, social security is thus good for growth. A possible explanation for this unconventional finding is
that given in Cigno (1993), Cigno and Rosati (1993, 1996, 1997) and Rosati (1996), namely that compulsory saving in the
form of pension contributions tends to displace childbearing and intra-family transfers, rather than asset formation.
However, the negative effect of social security on fertility tends to erode the system’s own contributory base. That is one of
the reasons why pay-as-you-go pension systems tend to be financially unstable.
A significant recovery of the fertility rate could not be achieved, according to our estimates, by moderate increases
in child benefits, because their effects do not appear to be sufficienly strong. The reason, as already pointed out, is that the10
cost of a child, consisting in large measure of the opportunity-cost of the mother’s time, is extremely high. Indeed, in
Germany as everywhere else, fertility responds negatively to female wage rates.
Simulation results indicate that a substantial recovery of German fertility, strong enough to eliminate much of the
solvency problem faced by the German social security system, could be engineered, without too negative consequences for
household saving, by a modest reduction in social security coverage. Some of this reduction could be achieved, without the
need to reduce pension levels, by restraining early retirement. In view of evidence that, in Germany, the very old have
difficulty in spending their pensions (Boersch-Supan and Stahl, 1991; Boersch-Supan, 1994), some trimming should not be
too painful.
Sinn (1998) argues that pay-as-you-go pension systems can be welfare improving only so long as pension benefits
are not so high, that pensioners return part of them to their children in the form of bequests. The just mentioned evidence of
involuntary saving by the very old suggests that pension benefits in Germany may indeed be too high.
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APPENDIX
Tab. A1: Unit-root ADF tests
1
Equation              I(1)                    I(2)
Fert                   2.3                     3.6**
Sav                     2.8                     3.5*
SSC                   2.7                     3.8**
CB                      .2                     5.7**
SD                    2.4                      3.4*
Int                     2.0                      3.8**
Wf                    2.7                      3.4*
Wm                   2.7                      3.9**
1 Including two lags and a constant term.
    Critical values: 5% = 2,9;  1% = 3,6.
Tab. A2: Mis-specification tests
Equation                Portmanteau       LM           Norm          ARCH
     Fert                           4.2                    .2                 1.2                .4
     Sav                           1.6                    .1                 1.6                .1
     SSC                          3.9                    .3                 .07              .0005
     CB                            7.0                   .02                 3                 .02
     SD                            3.4                    2.7               4.9             .0007
     Int                             5.9                    2.2               11*             .006
     Wf                           12.7                 .0006             2.6                .4
     Wm                           4.6                   .02                1.3              .04
Whole model              273.3                                       19.9
Tab. A3: Cointegration tests
 H0: rank=p        l lmax    corrected    95%         trace      corrected     95%
 p ==  0         95.9**      49.5        51.4            300.2**      154.6       156.0
 p <=  1        58.0**      29.9        45.3            204.2**      105.2       124.2
 p <=  2         50.2**      25.9        39.4            146.2**       75.3          94.2
 p <=  3         37.3*        19.2        33.5              95.9**       49.4          68.5
 p <=  4         25.9          13.4        27.1              58.6**       30.2          47.2
 p <=  5         17.7            9.1        21.0              32.7*         16.8          29.7
 p <=  6        13.7            7.0        14.1              15.0             7.7          15.4
 p <=  7            1.3            0.7          3.8                1.3             0.7            3.8                                                               Figure 1
                                                    Figure 2
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Total Fertility Rate Child Benefits Rate                                              Figure 3
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Inflation rate Real interest rate                                                             Figure 5













































































Real social old-age security benefits per population aged >65
Real social security benefits per population aged >65









































































Social old-age security benefits - contributions
Social security benefits - contributionsFigure 7
Actual and Projected Fertility Rates
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